Capacity precommitment and price competition yield cournot outcomes
Luis Ubeda and
Diego Moreno ()
UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
We study an industry of a homogeneous good where n firms with identical technology compete by first building capacity, and then, after observing the capacity decisions, choosing a "reservation price" at which they are willing to sell their entire capacities. We show that every pure strategy equilibrium yields the Cournot outcome, and that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium.
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Journal Article: Capacity precommitment and price competition yield the Cournot outcome (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we014408
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