Capacity precommitment and price competition yield cournot outcomes

Luis Ubeda
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Diego Moreno ()

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We study an industry of a homogeneous good where n firms with identical technology compete by first building capacity, and then, after observing the capacity decisions, choosing a "reservation price" at which they are willing to sell their entire capacities. We show that every pure strategy equilibrium yields the Cournot outcome, and that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium.

Date: 2001-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Capacity precommitment and price competition yield the Cournot outcome (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we014408

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