A gibbad-satterthwaite theorem for public good economies
Diego Moreno () and
María José Moscoso
UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
We study the properties of mechanisms for deciding upon the provision of public goods when the feasible set is exogenously given (by financial and/or technological constraints), and individuals' preferences are represented by continuous, increasing and concave utility functions, and we establish a result analog to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: strategy-proof mechanisms are dictatorial. Further, efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms are strongly dictatorial (i.e., maximize the dictator's welfare on the entire feasible set.)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we014912
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