The value of public information in a cournot duopoly

Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Diego Moreno (diego.moreno@uc3m.es)

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We derive alternative sufficient conditions for the value of public information to be either positive or negative in a Cournot duopoly where firms technology exhibits constant returns to scale.

Date: 2002-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/rest/api/core/bitstreams ... 46072e4a84a0/content (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we024617

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ana Poveda (biblioteca@db.uc3m.es).