Some results on strategic voting and proportional representation with multidimensional policy space
Francesco De Sinopoli and
Giovanna Iannantuoni ()
UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
We study a model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. We first show, via an example, that the assumption of quasi-concavity of the utility function is not sufficient to obtain the result that only the extreme parties get votes, contrary to the unidimensional case. We, then, study two cases in which stronger assumptions on voters' preferences assure that voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we025721
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