List pricing and pure strategy outcomes in a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly
Antón García Díaz and
Praveen Kujal ()
UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
Non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly model is analyzed. The standard model is modified to include a list pricing stage and a subsequent price discounting stage. Both firms first simultaneously choose a maximum list price and then decide to lower the price, or not, in a subsequent discounting stage. List pricing works as a credible commitment device that induces the pure strategy outcome. It is shown that for a general class of rationing rules there exists a sub-game perfect equilibrium that involves both firms playing pure strategies. This equilibrium payoff dominates any other sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game. Further unlike the dominant firm interpretation of a price leader, we show that the small firm may have incentives to commit to a low price and in this sense assume the role of a leader.
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Working Paper: List princing and pure strategy outcomes in a bertrand edgeworth duopoly (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we034918
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