On the equivalence between subgame perfection and sequentiality

Carlos Pimienta () and Cristian M. Litan

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We identify the maximal set of finite extensive forms for which the sets of subgame perfect and sequential equilibrium strategies coincide for any possible assignment of the payoff function. We also identify the maximal set of finite extensive forms for which the outcomes induced by the two solution concepts coincide.

Date: 2005-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we052616

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