Information transmission in the absence of commitment

Carlos Maravall Rodriguez ()

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: I consider an election with candidate entry and a state variable that affects all players' utility, as it translates their ideal points. Candidates are informed of the realization of the state, whilst voters are not. I study the effect of candidates' commitment on equilibria. I show that if they cannot commit, their private information is of no consequence for the election (i.e. even in a decisiontheoretic sense). Instead, when they can commit this is a standard signaling game.

Date: 2005-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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