Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case

Francesco De Sinopoli
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Giovanna Iannantuoni ()

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We study the strategic behavior of voters in a model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions on voters' preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.

Date: 2005-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dcm and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case (2008)
Working Paper: Extreme Voting under Proportional Representation: The Multidimensional Case (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we053421

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