A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel

Roberto Serrano and Ken-Ichi Shimomura

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We propose positive and normative foundations for the average prekernel of NTU games, and compare them with the existing ones for the prekernel. In our non-cooperative analysis, the average prekernel is approximated by the set of equilibrium payoffs of a game where each player faces the possibility of bargaining at random against any other player. In the cooperative analysis, we characterize the average prekernel as the unique solution that satisfies a set of Nash-like axioms for two-person games, and versions of average consistency and its converse for multilateral settings

Date: 2005-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we055827

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