Foundations for contest success functions

Luis Corchon and Matthias Dahm

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We examine two approaches to contest success functions. In the first we analyze the implications of contestants´ incomplete information concerning the `type´ of the contest administrator. While in the case of two contestants this approach can rationalize prominent contest success functions, we show that it runs into difficulties when there are more agents. Our second approach interprets contest success functions as sharing rules and establishes a connection to bargaining and claims problems which is independent of the number of contestants. Both approaches provide foundations for popular contest success functions and guidelines for the definition of new ones.

Keywords: Endogenous; Contests; Contest; Success; Function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Foundations for contest success functions (2010)
Working Paper: Foundations for contest success functions (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we070401

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