On the generic finiteness of outcome distributions for bimatrix game forms

Nikolai Kukushkin () and Cristian M. Litan
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Francisco Marhuenda ()

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We provide an example of an outcome game form with two players for which there is in an open set of utilities for both players such that, in each of the associated games, the set of Nash equilibria induce a continuum of outcome distributions. The case for three or more players has been settled by Govindan and McLennan [3].

Keywords: Generic; finiteness; Nash; equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-04-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we073520

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