Knowledge disclosure as intellectual property rights

Carlos Ponce ()

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We study a model in which an inventor discloses knowledge about its innovation and then a rival chooses the probability of attaining a competing invention. Disclosures, by creating prior art, diminish the probability that the rival has of receiving a patent for its invention (legal externality), but, by revealing knowledge, they decrease the marginal cost of R&D (knowledge externality). We stress the following result. If the knowledge externality is large compared to the legal externality, decreasing the patentability standards leads to fewer disclosures and may hinder R&D. We also determine the impact of changes in market payoffs on the equilibrium level of disclosures and R&D.

Keywords: Disclosure; Patentability; standard; Threat; effect; Independent; invention; Transfer; effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~, nep-knm and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we077140

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