Contract choice, incentives and political capture in public transport services

Marc Ivaldi
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Philippe Gagnepain

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We consider a framework of contractual interactions between urban transport authorities and transport operators. We estimate simultaneously the choice of contract by the authorities and the effect of regulation on the cost reducing activity of the operators. We test whether regulatory schemes currently implemented in the industry are the observable items of a more general menu of second best contracts. We suggest that the generation process of the data we have in hand is better explained by the political aspects of regulation. Moreover, the cost reducing effort of the operators is greater under fixed-price regimes, compared to the cost-plus case.

Date: 2009-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/rest/api/core/bitstreams ... 45c1f744bd8e/content (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Contract choice, incentives, and political capture in public transport services (2009)
Working Paper: Contract choice, incentives, and political capture in public transport services (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we096641

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ana Poveda ().