Endogenous governance transparency and product market competition
Ana Hidalgo-Cabrillana ()
UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
This paper endogenizes both the choice of governance transparency at the firrm level and the portfolio decisions of investors. ln the model, managers raise money in financial markets that are subject to imperfections arising from the non-observability of output for financiers. Investors, on the other hand, observe a signal correlated with returns. Formal contracting are needed to prevent expropriation of the investor`s wealth by the manager. The contract endogenously determines the nature and formation of the cost and benefits of voluntary disclosure. Managers optimally decide on the quality of the signal —used here as the measure of governance transparency- trading off the possibility of expropriating profits against the opportunity to raise more capital. We show that one important driving force behind governance transparency is product market competition: tougher competition translates into lower frictions on the capital market, since investors have better possibilities for portfolio diversification. Managers react to this loss of bargaining power by increasing transparency. Furthermore, firms characterized by low corporate profits or firms where investor protection is strong at the country level will be more likely to avoid voluntary disclosure regimes.
Keywords: Corporate; governance; Voluntary; disclosure; Portfolio; choice; Incentives; Product; market; competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G11 G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Endogenous governance transparency and product market competition (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we1021
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