Intra-firm bargaining and learning in a market equilibrium
Mikhail Drugov ()
UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
This paper introduces an agency relationship into a dynamic game with informational externalities. Two principals bargain with their respective agents about the production cost which is the private information of the agents and is correlated between them. We find that the agency relationship creates an incentive for simultaneous production, even if this involves an inefficient delay. As the commitment power of the principals decreases, this incentive becomes stronger. When principals compete, the effect of competition is decomposed into two parts. Inter-period competition (from past and future actions) pushes principals towards simultaneous actions, while intra-period competition (from concurrent actions) does the opposite.
Keywords: Bargaining; Adverse; selection; Learning; Information; Externalities; Delay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D82 D83 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-cta and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we1102
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ana Poveda ().