Give peace a chance: the effect of incomplete and imperfect information on mediation

Luis Corchon and Anil Yildizparlak

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: In this paper we study mediation when two countries might fight a war over the ownership of a resource. Under complete information mediation is always successful, but a little bit of asymmetric information or some imperfect observability may render mediation impossible

Date: 2011-06-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we1114

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