The closed primaries versus the top-two primary

Pablo Amoros, Ricardo Martinez () and M. Socorro Puy

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: The top-two primary recently approved in states like Washington, California, and Alaska eliminates the closed party primaries and creates instead a single ballot in which the first and second place winners pass to the general election. We compare the electoral consequences of the top-two primary with those of the closed primaries. We present a model where each primary procedure induce a sequential game with three stages: candidate-entry stage, primary election, and general election. We analyze the equilibria of these games and show that the top-two primary contributes to political moderation and may increase the number of swing states.

Keywords: Closed; primaries; Voting; system; Open; primaries; Top-two; primary; Political; moderation; Sequential; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-09-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: The Closed Primaries versus the Top-two Primary (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we1319

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