Contingent commodities and implementation

Siddhartha Chattopadhyay and Jörg Naeve

IFCS - Working Papers in Economic History.WH from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Instituto Figuerola

Abstract: In this note we study the relevance of using contingent commodity allocations when states are not directly contractible. In such a setting, a contingent commodity allocation takes the form of a social choice function, and the question is whether this function is implementable. Using only very mild assumptions on the rule for selecting contingent commodity allocations, we derive a strong negative result which proves to be robust with respect to different solution concepts employed for implementation. These findings have interesting implications for the interpretation of Arrow–Debreu economies.

Keywords: Contingent; commodities; Implementation; Single-crossing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:whrepe:3815

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