Bonds and Brands: intermediaries and reputation in sovereign debt markets 1820-1830

Marc Flandreau and Juan Flores Zendejas

IFCS - Working Papers in Economic History.WH from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Instituto Figuerola

Abstract: How does sovereign debt emerge and become sustainable? This paper provides a new answer to this unsolved puzzle. Focusing on the early 19th century, we argue that intermediaries’ market power served to overcome information asymmetries and sustained the development of sovereign debt. Relying on insights from corporate finance, we argue that capitalists turned to intermediaries’ reputations to guide their investment strategies. The outcome was a two-tier global bond market, which was sustained by hierarchical relations among intermediaries. This novel theoretical perspective is backed by new archival evidence and empirical data that have never been gathered so far.

Keywords: Financial; history; Information; asymmetries; Financial; intermediation; Financial; crises; Sovereign; debt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D24 F37 G15 G24 N20 N23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fmk and nep-his
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:whrepe:wp07-12

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