The Shapley group value

Elisenda Molina and Juan Tejada

DES - Working Papers. Statistics and Econometrics. WS from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Estadística

Abstract: Following the original interpretation of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953a) as a priori evaluation of the prospects of a player in a multi-person iteraction situation, we propose a group value, which we call the Shapley group value, as a priori evaluation of the prospects of a group of players in a coalitional game when acting as a unit. We study its properties and we give an axiomatic characterization. We motivate our proposal by means of some relevant applications of the Shapley group value, when it is used as an objective function by a decision maker who is trying to identify an optimal group of agents in a framework in which agents interact and the attained benefit can be modeled by means of a transferable utility game. As an illustrative example we analyze the problem of identifying the set of key agents in a terrorist network.

Keywords: Game; Theory; TU; games; Shapley; value; Group; values (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:wsrepe:ws133430

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