Oligopolistic Competition as a Common Agency Game

Claude, D’aspremont and Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Claude d'Aspremont

No 2005018, Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) from Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques

Abstract: In applying the common agency framework to the context of an oligopolistic industry, we want to go beyond the classical dichotomy between Cournot and Bertrand competition. We define two games, the oligopolistic game and the corresponding concept of oligopolistic equilibrium, and an associated auxiliary game that can be interpreted as a common agency game and that has the same set of equilibria. The parameterization of the set of (potential) equilibria in terms of competitive thoughness is derived from the first order conditions of the auxiliary game. The enforceability of monopolistic competition, of price and quantity competition, and of collusion is examined in this framework. We then describe the (reduced) set of equilibria one would obtain, first in the non-intrinsic case and then in the case where a global approach would be adopted instead of partial equilibrium approach. Finally, we illustrate the use of the concept of oligopolistic equilibrium and of the corresponding parameterization by referring to the standard case of symmetric quadratic utility.

Pages: 32
Date: 2005-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Oligopolistic competition as a common agency game (2010)
Working Paper: Oligopolistic competition as a common agency game (2010)
Working Paper: Oligopolistic competition as a common agency game (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvec:2005018

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