Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Gwenael Piaser ()

No 2005024, Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) from Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques

Abstract: In this paper we present a model of credit market with several homogeneous lenders competing to finance an investment project. Contracts are non-exclusive, hence the borrower can accept whatever subset of the offered loans. We use the model to discuss efficiency issues in competitive economies with asymmetric information and non-exclusive agreements. We characterize the equilibria of this common agency game with moral hazard and show that they all belong to the constrained Pareto frontier

Keywords: Common Agency; Moral Hazard; Parto Efficiency; Second Best (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D61 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 2005-03-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market (2006)
Working Paper: Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market (2006)
Working Paper: Multiple lending and constrained efficiency in the credit market (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvec:2005024

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