Incentives to innovate in oligopolies

Paul Belleflamme and Cecilia Vergari ()

No 2006008, Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) from Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques

Abstract: In the spirit of Arrow (1962), we examine, in an oligopoly model with horizontally differentiated products, how much a firm is willing to pay for a process innovation that it would be the only one to use. We show that different measures of competition (number of firms, degree of product differentiation, Cournot vs Bertrand) affect incentives to innovate in non-monotoic, different, and potentially ways.

Keywords: innovation; profit incentive; oligopoly; product differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32
Date: 2006-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-ind, nep-ino and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE IN OLIGOPOLIES (2011)
Working Paper: Incentives to innovate in oligopolies (2011)
Working Paper: Incentives to innovate in oligopolies (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvec:2006008

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