Climate coalitions: a theoretical and computational appraisal

Thierry Bréchet, Francois Gerard and Henry Tulkens

No 2007006, Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) from Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques

Abstract: Using an updated version of the CWS model (introduced by Eyckmans and Tulkens in Resource and Energy Economics 2003), this paper intends to evaluate with numbers the respective merits of two competing notions of coalition stability in the standard global public goods model as customarily applied to the climate change problem. After a reminder of the model structure and of the definition of the two game theoretical stability notions involved - namely, core stabiilty and internal-external stability, the former property is shown to hold for the grand coalition in the CWS model only if resource transfers of a specific form between countries are introduced. It is further shown that while the latter property holds neither for the grand coalition nor for most large coalitions, it is nevertheless verified in a weak sense that involves transfers (dubbed “potential internal stability”) for most small coalitions. The reason for this difference is brought to light, namely the differing rationale that inspires the transfers in either case. Finally, it is shown that the stable coalitions that perform best (in termes of carbon concentration and global welfare) always are composed of both industrialized and developing countries. Two sensitivity analyses confirm the robustness of all these results.

Keywords: climate change; coalitions; simulation; integrated assessment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C73 D9 F42 Q2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25
Date: 2007-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-ene, nep-env and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Climate Coalitions: A Theoretical and Computational Appraisal (2007)
Working Paper: Climate coalitions: a theoretical and computational appraisal (2007)
Working Paper: Climate Coalitions: A Theoretical and Computational Appraisal (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvec:2007006

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