Games with Complementarities

Filippo Calciano ()

No 2007011, Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) from Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques

Abstract: We introduce a class of games with complementarities that has the quasisupermodular games, hence the supermodular games, as a special case. Our games retain the main property of quasisupermodular games : the Nash set is a nonemply complete lattice. We use monotonicity properties on the best reply that are weaker than those in the literature, as well as pretty simple and linked with an intuitive idea of complementarity. The sufficient conditions on the payoffs are weaker than those in quasisupermodular games. We also separate the conditions implying existence of a greatest and a least Nash equilibrium from those, stronger, implying that the Nash set is a complete lattice

Keywords: Complementarity; Quasisupermodularity; Supermodular games; Monotone comparative statics; Nash equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31
Date: 2007-03-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Games with complementarities (2007)
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