Revenu minimum, allocations-chômage et subventions à l'emploi: un modèle macroéconomique simple

Pierre Dehez () and Jean-Paul Fitoussi

No 1992010, LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: Starting from the problem of existence of a Walrasian equilibrium in relation to the question of survival, the consequences of imposing a minimum real income are studied within the framework of a simple macro-economic model with a disaggregated labor market. Two solutions are considered to face the unemployment which may result : the payment of unemployment compensations on the one hand, and the enforcement of full employment by employment subsidies on the other hand. It is shown that the existence of en equilibrium may not be guaranteed if a budget deficit results. It is also shown that an increase in the minimum income does not necessarily induce an increase in wages nor a worsening of unemployment.

Keywords: salaires; assurance-chômage; emploi; modèles économiques (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20
Date: 1992-01-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:1992010

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