Bargaining Over Employment as a Firm Strategic Choice

Jacques Bughin

No 1992017, LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: This note provides a simple theoretical arguments, borrowed from the managerial incentives literature, as to why unionized firms acting non-cooperatively in the output market may find optimal to commit to bargaining outcomes off their (static) labor demand curve, hence restricting their behavior to non-profit maximizing practices. The theoretical model shows that power over labor conceded strategically to the union by the firm is negatively linked to union power over wages. Regression analyses on a cross-section of Belgian manufacturing firms seem to support the prediction that bargaining power over employment depends on product market structure and variables affecting union wages.

Keywords: management; bargaining; decision making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16
Date: 1992-01-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:1992017

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