Strategic Managerial Incentives in an Unionized Duopoly

Jacques Bughin

No 1992018, LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: This note reconsiders the problem of managerial incentives in the context of an unionized Nash-Cournot oligopoly. It is hightlighted that managerial incentives weaken union power at industry equilibrium, although, as a symptom of a prisoner dilemma, unions are not reluctant to the existence of those managerial contracts. A direct consequence of this finding is that the adequate employer’s utility function when modelling wage negotiation outcomes should be different from simple firm profit-maximization.

Keywords: management; trade unions; monopolies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12
Date: 1992-01-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:1992018

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