Union-Firm Bargaining Scope and Structure under Strategic Foreign Direct Investment
Jacques Bughin and
Stefano Vannini
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Stefano Vannini: UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)
No 1994026, LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)
Abstract:
This paper analyses the relationship between union power and the presence of multinational enterprises. The focus is on how union-firm bargaining structure and bargaining scope affect-and are affected by-strategic foreign direct investment (FDI). Concerning the bargaining scope (for a given bargaining structure) we firstly determine which one-i.e. right-to-manage (RTM) or efficient bargaining (EB)- is more favorable to FDI. Secondly, cases are identified in wich host-country firm(s) and union(s) agree on a bargaining agenda. Concerning the bargaining structure, we determine which one (i.e. partial unionization or full unionization -either centralized or decentralized-) maximizes the probability of MNE entry. Implications on host-country unemployment are also drawn.
Keywords: foreign direct investment; multinational enterprises; efficient bargaining; right-to-manage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 J51 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27
Date: 1994-10-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:1994026
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