Efficient Bargaining with Labor Under-Utilization

Pierre Dehez (), David de la Croix and Eric Toulemonde

No 1995005, LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: The standard efficient contract involving a monopolistic firm and a union has always been derived under the assumption that the firm operates efficiently, i.e. it uses fully its labor force. However, nothing constrains the firm to do so and production with under-utilization of labor may actually occur. The implications of ignoring that possibility and the conditions under-utilization effectively occurs are studied.

JEL-codes: D43 J50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9
Date: 1995-01-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/9505.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:1995005

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Virginie LEBLANC ().