Moral Commitment and Individual Optimization

Christian Arnsperger
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Christian Arnsperger: UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES); Université catholique de Louvain, Chaire Hoover

No 1995016, LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: This essay explores the possibility of modelling, within a framework of individual optimization, choice based on moral commitment. The basis is Sen’s (1977) classic article. The standard tool of utility maximization is replaced by Sen’s idea of a "ranking of action-rankings", to which I add the idea-not present in Sen’s idea own analysis- of strict lexicographic application of various action rankings. In that framework, a morally committed agent is someone whose top-priority action ranking differs from his personal welfare . the notion of " sacrifice ", or " excessive strains of commitment ", is discussed in detail. While the presence of sacrifice is-contrary to what Sen seems to indicate-not a necessary feature of commitment, strict lexicography may imply that the sacrifice of personal welfare is " too large " for the individual. A particular case of this is the strain due to an unconditional moral commitment. Two solutions to lessen the strains of commitment are proposed, and a discussion of utilitarian ethics in the context of moral commitment shows that the classic model of " rule utilitarianism " is ill-adapted to dal with the potential strains flowing from unconditional commitment.

Pages: 18
Date: 1995-05-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:1995016

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