Stabilité stratégique et pollution-stock transnationale: le cas linéaire

Marc Germain, Henry Tulkens and Aart de Zeeuw
Additional contact information
Marc Germain: UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
Henry Tulkens: UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE); UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), Facultés Universitaires St-Louis, Brussels

No 1997001, LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: Most of the contributions that deal with cooperation issues in transfrontier pollution problems, bear only on pollutants that do not accumulate. Moreover, most articles that deal with the dynamics of the problem (implied by the pollutant's accumulation) leave aside the issue of the voluntary implementation of an international cooperative optimum. The aim of the present contribution is to overtake these two limitations. Using both differential and cooperative game theory, we define at each moment of time a scheme for abatement costs through financial transfers between countries, which makes cooperation better for each of them than non-cooperation (defined as a Nash equilibrium). This sharing scheme is also "strategically stable", in the sense that no coalition is capable to make its members better off than what they would obtain at the optimum with transfers. This results is obtained under the hypothesis that the countries' environmental damage functions are linear, in a framework where countries do reevaluate at each period the advantages to cooperate or not, given the current stock of pollutant.

Keywords: pollution internationale; externalités; jeux différentiels; jeux coopératifs; transferts financiers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 1997-01-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/9701.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:1997001

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Virginie LEBLANC ().