Competition through second-hand products when consumers differ in risk aversion
Isabel Grilo and
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Isabel Grilo: UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE); Lille III, Gremars
No 1997011, LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)
When consumers differ in their attitude towards risk, price competition between products of uncertain characteristics may be analyzed using address-models of product differentiation. These models provide a natural set-up for analyzing industries in which products of different reliability may coexist. This is in particular the case of second-hand markets. For such industries, we characterize the Nash equilibrium in prices and the associated market outcomes. They are shown to depend mainly on the distribution of risk aversion in the population. When the degree of reliability is chosen before price competition takes place, maximal differentiation results, yielding either horizontal or vertical differentiation configurations.
Keywords: differentiation; risk aversion; risky products (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:1997011
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