Terror as a Bargaining Instrument: A Case-Study of Dowry Violence in Rural India

Francis Bloch and Vijayendra Rao

No 1999020, LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: This paper examines how domestic violence may be used as an instrument to extract large transfers from a spouse's family. It is based on a case-study of three villages in Southern India, conducted by the authors, that combines qualitative and survey data. Based on the ethnographic evidence, we develop a non-cooperative bargaining and signaling model of dowries and domestic violence. The predictions from these models are tested with survey data. We find that women who pay smaller dowries suffer an increased risk of marital violence, as do women who come from richer families.

JEL-codes: J12 J16 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 1999-04-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Terror as a Bargaining Instrument: A Case Study of Dowry Violence in Rural India (2002)
Working Paper: Terror as a bargaining instrument: a case study of dowry violence in rural India (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:1999020

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