Regulation under Wealth Constraints

Axel Gautier ()

No 2000014, LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: This article studies the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown marginal cost. The problem described differs from Baron and Myerson [1982] because we suppose that the regulator faces a cash-in-advance constraint. The introduction of such a constraint may lead to the collapse of the incentive system.

Keywords: Regulation; asymmetric information; monopolist (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H42 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6
Date: 2000-06-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:2000014

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