Labor Market Policies and Equilibrium Employment: Theory and Application for Belgium

Bruno Van der Linden and Eric Dor
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Eric Dor: UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES); Université catholique de Lille, Faculté Libre des Sciences Economiques, Institut d’Economie Scientifique et de Gestion IESEG, Labores-CNRS

No 2001005, LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: This paper is concerned with the general equilibrium effects of active labor market programs and the unemployment insurance system (the replacement ratio and the level of sanctions). It develops an equilibrium job matching model where active programs and the rate of sanctions have an amiguous impact on the equilibrium employment rate. The model is simulated for Belgium. The simulations suggest that passive and active labor market policies do not have a substantial net impact on the employment rate.

Keywords: labor market policies; sanctions; equilibrium search model; matching function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J63 J64 J65 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 2001-02-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:2001005

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