Bargaining with Endogenous Deadlines

Ana Mauleon and Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
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Vincent J. Vannetelbosch: UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

No 2001021, LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: We develop a two-person negotiation model with complete information which makes endogenous both the deadline and the level of surplus destruction after the deadline. We show that the equilibrium outcome is always unique but might be inefficient. Moreover, as the bargaining period becomes short or as the players become very patient, the unique outcome is always inefficient

Keywords: bargaining; alternating-offers; deadlines; complete infomation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 J50 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12
Date: 2001-08-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2001-21.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Bargaining with endogenous deadlines (2004)
Working Paper: Bargaining with endogenous deadlines (2004)
Working Paper: Bargaining with an Endogenous Deadline (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:2001021

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