Stackelberg Duopoly with an Illyrian and Profit-Maximising Firm

Peter J. Law and Geoff Stewart
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Peter J. Law: UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK
Geoff Stewart: THE UNIVERSITY NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE, Department of Economics

No 1983026, Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: Illyrian labour-managed firms may have positively-inclined Cournot reaction functions. Consequently, in a “mixed” duopoly a determinate equilibrium can result in which the profit-maximising firm leads and the labour-managed firm follows. A simple example demonstrates this.

Pages: 6
Date: 1983-06-01
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