R&D rivalry Vs R&D cooperation under uncertainty

John Beath, Yannis Katsoulacos and David Ulph
Additional contact information
John Beath: Bristol University
David Ulph: Bristol University

No 1988041, Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: We consider whether or not R&D expenditures will be greater or less under a research joint venture (RJV) than under R&D competition and whether or not firms will always find the former preferable to the latter. With imitation difficult, the answer to the latter question depends on the relative strength of conflicting forces : whilst cooperation will increase expected payoffs through a positive “coordination effect” it will also intensify the competition faced by the innovator in the product market by enabling firms to gain access to the most recent technology. With imitation easy, on the other hand, firms will always prefer an RJV to R&D competition.

Pages: 12
Date: 1988-12-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40723870 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvre:1988041

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sebastien SCHILLINGS ().