National Insurance against Unevenly Distributed Shocks in a European Monetary Union

Jacques Melitz and Silvia Vori
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Silvia Vori: Banca d’Italia

No 1993014, Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: We examine proposals to introduce national insurance against unevenly distributed shocks in the European Community. This insurance would operate differently from tax and government spending activities that now yield regional insurance within countries, since these activities are mainly designed for other purpose such as income redistribution and general revenue-raising. According to our evidence, the appeal of such insurance is very limited because the risks are too highly correlated and there is an excessive chance that a country in difficulty would not receive aid. The costs of a continuing programme are likely to exceed the benefits.

JEL-codes: F41 F42 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24
Date: 1993-03-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Working Paper: National Insurance Against Unevenly Distributed Shocks in a European Monetary Union (1992)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvre:1993014

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