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Efficient Bargaining and Accomodation Policies

Henrik Jensen ()

No 1993043, Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: We show that accommodation policies may render efficient bargaining in the labour market unsustainable as a perfect Nash equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game. In fact, in the eyes of the labour market participants, efficient bargaining may be Pareto-dominated by the monopoly-union solution when the government places sufficiently high weight on employment targets.

JEL-codes: E61 E62 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22
Date: 1993-12-01
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