Subscription as a price descrimination device

Jean Gabszewicz and Nathalie Sonnac

No 1999043, Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: We propose a model representing a newspaper producer supplying a product which can be acquired by the readers either every day per one unit at a time, or by subscription. The population of potential buyers is differentiated according to the frequency at which they want to read the newspaper. First we identify the optimal pricing policy, namely, the optimal price for issues sold per unit at the newsstand, as well as the optimal subscription fee. Then we show that it is always more profitable to supply the market with both possibilites - free sale purchase and subscription - than to concentrate the sales on either of these alternatives.

JEL-codes: L L12 L8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14
Date: 1999-12-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/REL/1999043.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Subscription as a price discrimination device (1999)
Working Paper: Subscription as a price discrimination device (1997)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvre:1999043

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sebastien SCHILLINGS ().