Doping in Sport and Competition Design

Nicolas Eber and Jacques Thépot

No 1999044, Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: We develop a game-theoretic model of doping which focuses on the economic aspects of competitive sports. According to the model, incentives for athletes to use doping increase when (i) the efficiency of the drug test system is low, (ii) the number of competitions during one season is high, (iii) the spread of prizes from sports events is large, (iv) the perceived health cost is low. Implication for anti-doping policy are derived. We also discuss the optimal (anti-doping) competition design.

JEL-codes: C72 D78 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12
Date: 1999-12-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvre:1999044

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