Implicit tax co-ordination under repeated policy interactions

Marco Catenaro and Jean-Pierre Vidal
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Marco Catenaro: European Central Bank
Jean-Pierre Vidal: European Central Bank

No 2006011, Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: In the context of a stylised gaine theoretical framework of capital tax competition, we show that when repeated policy interactions are associated to a systematic punishment of the deviating policymaker, a coordinated outcome can be the solution to the non cooperative tax game. This resuit suggests that explicit forms of policy coordination, such as a centralised tax authority, could in fact be largely unnecessary.

Keywords: Policy coordination; international fiscal issues (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E61 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14
Date: 2006-03-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvre:2006011

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