Is Competition or Collusion in the Product Market Relevant for Labour Markets?
Fabian Bergès and
Additional contact information
Fabian Bergès: Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ, INRA, IDEI)
No 2008032, Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)
In non-union models, there is an ambiguous relationship between collusion on the product market and the resulting impact on the labour market. We can derive some conclusions by assuming a dual labour market with qualified and unqualified workers taking into account the efficiency effect when employing qualified workers. The framework adopted here consists of two firms competing to hire workers on the qualified labour market, and then competing (or colluding) on the product market to sell their production. While qualified workers are heterogeneous in their specialization, firm sell imperfect substitute goods on the product market. First if the two firms collude in the setting prices on the product market, this leads to an increase in the symmetric equilibrium wage in the qualified labour market, as well as a rise in productivity. Unions are not considered. Second, altough the number of unqualified workers hired decreases along with the total employment, the wage bill can rise because of intensified competition on the qualified labour market.
Keywords: Rent-Sharing; employment; oligopoly; Collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J21 J31 L13 Q13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Is Competition or Collusion in the Product Market Relevant for Labour Markets? (2008)
Working Paper: Is competition or collusion in the product market relevant for labour markets ? (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvre:2008032
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sebastien SCHILLINGS ().