On unilateral divorce and the “selection of marriages” hypothesis

Eric Langlais

No 2010031, Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: In this paper, the unilateral divorce law is modelled trough the combination of exclusive rights on the marriage dissolution and alternative compensation rules benefiting to the parent having custody of the children. Their influence are studied both in the short run (probability and efficiency of divorce and in the long run (selection of marriages). We show that a decrease in the costs of divorce proceedings has by no means commonplace consequences on the marriage contracting; particularly when consideration of parents' altruism and child support is introduced, more marriages are contracted when the cost of divorces decreases.

Keywords: marriage models; unilateral divorce law; the parents’ altruism and protective measure for children (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D1 J12 K10 K12 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 2010-09-01
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http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/REL/2010031.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On unilateral divorce and the “selection of marriages” hypothesis (2010)
Working Paper: On unilateral divorce and the "selection of marriages" hypothesis (2009)
Working Paper: On unilateral divorce and the "selection of marriages" hypothesis (2009)
Working Paper: On unilateral divorce and the "selection of marriages" hypothesis (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvre:2010031

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