Could environmental public policy be harmful for the environment ?

Mouez Fodha

No 2010042, Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: This article analyzes the consequences of environmental public policy when private agents have access to abatement activity, financed by private contributions. The issue at stake is the interactions between private involvement in abatement activities and public intervention. The analysis of the consequences of environmental tax policy on capital and environmental quality shows that public and private abatements may or may not be substitutable, depending on abatement efficiencies and on initial economic and environmental inefficiencies.

Keywords: Environmental externalities; abatement; tax policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q52 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19
Date: 2010-12-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/REL/2010042.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Could environmental public policy be harmful for the environment? (2010)
Working Paper: Could environmental public policy be harmful for the environment? (2010)
Working Paper: Could environmental public policy be harmful for the environment? (2010)
Working Paper: Could environmental public policy be harmful for the environment? (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvre:2010042

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