R&D Organization: Cooperation or Cross-Licensing?

Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin and Rim Lahmandi-Ayed

No 2011012, Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: Under the Cross-Licensing system (CL), firms are allowed to trade non cooperatively the results of R&D efforts, and compete in the innovation and production stages. First, the paper proposes a simple modeling of this system. Second, a relevant comparison is made with the Cartelized Research Joint Venture (RJV), the form of R&D cooperation recognized to be the best one. We prove that the Cross-Licensing system may be socially better than the Cartelized RJV. In terms of antitrust policy, for firms, the most favorable collusion mode is Joint Exploitation. We prove that firms are equally tempted by this mode, whether they are under CL or under Cartelized RJV.

Keywords: Cross-Licensing; R&D cooperation; Cartelized Research Joint Venture; R&D spillovers; Efficiency; Antitrust policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D23 L24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22
Date: 2011-03-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: R&D Organization: Cooperation or Cross-Licensing? (2011)
Working Paper: R&D Organization: Cooperation or Cross-Licensing? (2011)
Working Paper: R&D Organization: Cooperation or Cross-Licensing? (2011)
Working Paper: R&D Organization: Cooperation or Cross-Licensing? (2011)
Working Paper: R&D Organization: Cooperation or Cross-Licensing? (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvre:2011012

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