Is Selling Immigration Rights Politically Sustainable ?
Bertrand Crettez
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Bertrand Crettez: Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris II
No 2011042, Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)
Abstract:
This paper relies on Benhabib (1996)’ s immigration model to analyze the political sustainability of selling immigration permits, an idea proposed by Gary Becker. To simplify the analysis, we focus on the effects of immigration flows on input prices. We find that immigration quotas almost always generate the highest capital-labor ratio (and thus the highest wage rate). We also provide an example in which immigration permits generate the lowest value of the capital-labor ratio when permits sales are wasted. Under this last assumption, we show that if the wealth of the median voter is low enough, immigration quotas will be chosen over immigration permits. If the median voter’s wealth is high, then the issue of majority voting will be the system which delivers the lowest capital-labor ratio.
Keywords: immigration quotas; immigration permits; rights to immigrate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 J18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
Date: 2011-12-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvre:2011042
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