Small business participation procurement policy: Subcontracting vs Allotment

François Marechal and Pierre-Henri Morand ()
Additional contact information
François Marechal: University of Franche-Comté, CRESE

No 2012021, Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: Allotment and subcontracting are the two procedures enabling small businesses to participate in procurement. We compare these two procedures in the context of a procurement contract awarded by a first-price sealed-bid auction. We assume that the public buyer wishes to fulfil two different goals: to minimize expected costs of the contract for the public buyer and to maximize small businesses’ profit. We show that, under specific cost-technology conditions we determine, the allotment procedure not only enables extensive participation by small businesses but also can achieve the goal of minimizing expected total costs for the public buyer.

Keywords: Small Business; Auction; Procurement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19
Date: 2012-06-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41714311 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden

Related works:
Journal Article: Small business participation procurement policy: Subcontracting vs Allotment (2012)
Working Paper: Small business participation procurement policy: Subcontracting vs allotment (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvre:2012021

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sebastien SCHILLINGS ().